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Arrestees have the right to apply for bail and to be released pending their trial, where circumstances 
require it. There is a practice of requiring people to verify their addresses prior to bail being granted, 
and this is implemented in various ways by different magistrates’ courts; from a magistrate refusing 
to hear a bail application until there is a verified address, to a magistrate hearing the application but 
holding the decision over until a verifiable address is supplied. This practice is widespread, and unfairly 
prejudices the homeless and poor, whose addresses are difficult to verify. It also means that their 
pre-trial incarceration might be lengthier than their sentences. This article will argue that this practice 
should be subject to the interests of justice criteria, and that its current form does not meet this 
standard. We will also investigate what this practice might look like if carried out in compliance with 
the interests of justice criteria. Lastly, this article will argue that this practice in its current form fails to 
meet rule of law standards. These arguments will be made in the context of the right to equality, and 
discrimination against those living in poverty. It will be concluded that, in its current form, the practice 
is unconstitutional. 
Courts of law are frequently criticised for 
denying bail to accused persons. Critics argue 
that the courts place too much weight on some 
factors, and completely disregard others.1 
These include denying an accused bail because 
s/he does not own satisfactory assets, and is 
therefore considered a flight risk in the view of 
the presiding officer.2 In addition, the lack of a 
verifiable and/or fixed address affects the judge’s 
assessment of whether such an accused is 
likely to evade trial.3 Accused persons who can 
provide information about community and family 
ties, or who are permanently employed, or who 
can prove ownership of assets, are much less 
likely to be deemed a flight risk than those who 
cannot.4 A fixed residential address and the 
ownership of assets, while different, are both 
indicators of an accused’s economic status, 
and adjudicating bail applications on this basis 
discriminates against accused persons and runs 
counter to international human rights provisions 
and constitutional rights.5
South Africa already has a very high number 
of people in remand detention. Approximately 
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one third of persons detained in correctional 
facilities are on remand detention, and this 
number has grown more than 100% since 
1995.6 These growing numbers of remand 
detainees result from the lack of correctional 
centres, unnecessary detention (in instances of 
petty crimes), prohibitively high bail, incorrect 
application of the two-pronged bail inquiry, 
and lack of access to legal representation.7 
Depending on how harsh the prison conditions 
are, remand detainees are exposed to many 
life-threatening diseases, suffer loss of 
employment, lose contact with family members, 
and have a number of their constitutional rights 
violated daily.8
Denying bail exacerbates the already 
unacceptable levels of overcrowding in prisons 
by detaining high numbers of people who have 
not yet been found guilty of the crimes for which 
they stand accused.9 Research has shown 
that setting a high bail essentially amounts to a 
denial of bail – it discriminates against people 
living in poverty and means that large numbers 
of people remain in detention merely because 
they cannot afford to pay the set bail amount.10 
This has prompted interventions such as 
ensuring reasonable bail calculations in order 
to prevent pre-trial punishment.11 Research 
(discussed later in this article) has also shown 
that judicial officers more often consider the 
nature of the crime rather than the personal 
circumstances of the accused during the bail 
inquiry. Little attention has been paid to the 
way in which presiding officers rely heavily 
on a lack of assets ownership and lack of a 
verified address to justify denying or postponing 
bail, and how this not only discriminates 
against accused people living in poverty but 
also contributes to the growth of the remand 
detention population.
This article argues that placing too much 
emphasis on these factors when determining 
arrestees’ flight risk (and setting bail amounts) 
violates South African law, international human 
rights law and regional instruments. The article 
sets out how the courts assess flight risk by 
considering an accused’s fixed address and/or 
ownership of assets in the determination of bail, 
and the important role that presiding officers’ 
attitudes play in this regard. We then discuss 
what is required under an interests of justice 
criterion, how the courts should treat arrestees, 
given either an absence of assets or the failure 
of the prosecution to verify the physical address 
of an accused, and how the courts should 
assess whether an arrestee poses a flight risk. 
The article proposes some recommendations 
and suggests alternative strategies to enable 
bail for arrested persons without violating their 
human rights.
The requirement of a fixed address 
and/or ownership of assets for bail 
Before a court considers a bail application, the 
accused’s physical address must be verified 
through documentary evidence or by the 
investigating officer, who physically has to go to 
the address in question to confirm whether the 
accused does in fact live there. The investigating 
officer will monitor the accused person while 
s/he is out on bail, and will check the given 
address in the event that the accused does not 
attend court on a day that s/he was required 
to do so.12 If this address is not yet established 
in time for the accused’s first appearance in 
court (which is usually when bail applications 
are heard), the presiding officer may postpone 
the matter for up to seven days under section 
50(6)(d)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act.13 (We 
return to a discussion of the bail provisions in 
the Criminal Procedure Act, below).
A 2016 study, which observed bail applications 
at the Cape Town and Wynberg magistrates’ 
courts, showed that 16 out of 37 cases 
were postponed in accordance with section 
50(6)(d)(i), pending the verification of the 
accused’s permanent residential address.14 
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Bail was not granted in five cases because 
police officers were not able to find and verify 
the accused’s residential address.15 Bail hearings 
had been postponed at least once prior to the 
hearings observed in all of these cases.16 A 
2013 study into how bail hearings affected the 
remand detention population in Gauteng similarly 
showed that a large number of bail hearings 
were postponed in order for the accused’s 
address to be verified prior to the granting of 
bail.17 When an accused does not have a fixed 
or readily verifiable address, the court is unlikely 
to believe that the accused will appear once 
the trial commences, or that the correctional 
officers will be able to locate and monitor the 
accused person if they do not return to court as 
required.18 Presiding officers have acknowledged 
that the concept of a fixed address is 
problematic in the South African context, where 
many people live in informal settlements.19
Existing research has also shown that courts 
often view accused persons who own few or 
no assets as a possible flight risk.20 Presiding 
officers in seven hearings observed and analysed 
by Omar took the view that a lack of ownership 
of assets meant that the accused would be a 
flight risk.21 In three of these seven cases, the 
courts characterised the accused as ‘likely to 
abscond’,22 despite the fact that they were 
employed.23 The problem with this type of 
approach by the courts is that, as held in 
S v Letaoana,24 ‘to take into account the minimal 
assets possessed by an accused as a factor for 
refusing bail is tantamount to imposing a penalty 
for poverty’.25
The practice of requiring fixed addresses in order 
to grant bail disproportionately affects black 
South Africans living in poverty. Accused persons 
of higher economic standing, who likely live in 
a residential area, can easily and quickly verify 
their address by producing a copy of their rates 
and taxes bill, an account statement or similar 
document. This is taken as full and adequate 
verification of their address. South Africa has 
many people who reside in informal housing 
(sometimes unlawfully occupying pieces of land 
close to prospective places of employment), 
and who consequently are not able to meet 
these requirements.
A related concern are the variable ways that 
courts implement the requirement for a fixed 
address and/or ownership of assets. From 
our own observations in magistrates’ courts 
around Johannesburg (which we conducted in 
order to better understand the requirement in 
practice), we have seen presiding officers who 
insist that only an affidavit by an investigating 
officer is suitable for verification of an address, 
while others accept testimony by the accused’s 
relatives and family members for the same 
purpose. Strictly speaking, there is no specific 
provision in South African law that sets out 
that a fixed address and ownership of assets 
is a prerequisite for granting bail (as cases like 
Letaoana have questioned). Instead, there is 
limited law to guide presiding officers in respect 
of how addresses must be verified, which 
creates uncertainty and a lack of uniformity in 
how the law is applied.
Legal framework
For an international treaty to be binding in 
South Africa it must be enacted into law 
by the legislature, even if South Africa is a 
signatory to the treaty.26 However, treaties can 
act as interpretative tools for understanding 
rights even before they are enacted into law.27 
International law is therefore important, as it 
creates obligations for South Africa to develop 
and enact laws that are in line with international 
human rights standards.
International instruments
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) is considered the foundation of 
international human rights law.28 The UDHR 
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was adopted in 1948, and precedes a number 
of international human rights treaties, which 
are legally binding instruments to signatory 
states.29 The UDHR recognises that all human 
beings have basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and that such freedoms and rights 
are applicable to everyone.30 Further, through 
the UDHR the international community made 
a commitment to uphold dignity and justice 
for all, regardless of people’s ‘nationality, place 
of residence, gender, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, language, or any other status’.31 
Detained persons as a vulnerable group have 
human rights that are protected under the 
UDHR, and, like all other human beings, are 
entitled to their fundamental freedoms.32
Article 3 of the UDHR guarantees the right ‘to 
life, liberty and security of the person’.33 Article 
11 provides the right of accused persons 
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
in accordance with the law,34 and Article 9 
protects against being subjected to arbitrary 
arrest and/or arbitrary detention.35
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
Article 9 (1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which 
South Africa is a party,36 guarantees the 
right to liberty and freedom of security, and 
outlaws arbitrary arrest and detention.37 To 
comply with article 9 of the ICCPR, states 
may not deprive people’s liberty in a manner 
that is not authorised by the law, and where 
they do deprive a person of liberty this ‘must 
not be manifestly unproportional, unjust or 
unpredictable’.38 Omar argues that the courts’ 
practice of placing too much weight on the 
unavailability of a fixed address or ownership 
of property, which proportionally impacts on 
the lives of people living in poverty, means that 
the practice is unjust.39 Further, because the 
practice is not strictly found in any specific 
legislation, it is unpredictable.
The United Nations (UN) Human Rights 
Committee holds that the definition of 
arbitrariness is not limited to conduct that is 
contrary to the law but rather, arbitrariness is 
inclusive of inappropriate, unjust actions or 
omissions, which are unpredictable.40 People 
must therefore only be arrested for lawful 
reasons, and must also be detained only under 
circumstances that are reasonable, otherwise 
the detention is unlawful.41
Article 9(3) of the ICCPR provides that 
detention ‘shall not be the “general rule”’ 
and advocates for remand detainees to be 
released from prisons, subject to conditions, 
which may include bail money or other types 
of guarantees.42 Although the Human Rights 
Committee has consistently said that the general 
rule is subject to the exception where there is a 
possibility that the accused would abscond,43 an 
inability to show ownership of assets and/or to 
provide a fixed address does not automatically 
mean the accused will evade trial.44 Accused 
persons who do not own property or have 
a fixed address should still be released from 
prison during the pre-trial period, subject to bail 
conditions and/or other guarantees.
This position is further amplified by the UN 
Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial 
Measures (the Tokyo Rules),45 which require 
that pre-trial detention should only be used 
as a measure of last resort and should not 
be longer than necessary.46 Presiding officers 
should as a matter of principle always consider 
non-custodial measures, which may include 
conditions such as periodically visiting the local 
police station. Of course, these conditions may 
pose an additional burden to accused persons 
who cannot afford regular transport to the 
police station.
Detained persons also have the right to be 
treated equally, equality being characterised 
as ‘the most important principle imbuing and 
inspiring the concept of human rights’.47 Article 
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26 of the ICCPR provides that everyone is equal 
before the law and that everyone is equally 
entitled to the protection of the law.48 Article 
2(1) of the ICCPR disallows discrimination in 
the context of all rights and freedoms listed 
under the ICCPR, including the right to liberty.49 
Accused persons without any fixed address or 
ownership of assets should therefore not be 
treated any differently than any other accused 
just because of their financial circumstances. 
The law, for them too, requires that detention be 
a measure of last resort.
Regional instruments
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights50 (the African Charter), to which South 
Africa is a party,51 does not have a specific bail 
provision, which, it has been argued, weakens 
its ability to adequately protect the rights of 
people seeking bail.52 Article 6 of the African 
Charter provides that ‘every individual shall 
have the right to liberty and to the security of his 
person. No one may be deprived of his freedom 
except for reasons and conditions previously 
laid down by law. In particular, no one may be 
arbitrarily arrested or detained.’53 Although the 
African Charter does not explicitly set out the 
right to be presumed innocent, it does provide 
that people must be protected from arbitrary 
detention.54 The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, in a case where accused 
persons were detained for over three years, 
held that detaining people without the possibility 
of bail amounts to arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
under article 6 of the African Charter.55
In addition to article 6 of the African Charter, 
the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has established a number 
of standards that protect the right to be 
presumed innocent.56 Section M(1)(e) of the 
Principles on the Right to a Fair Trial57 provides 
that states must not keep accused persons in 
detention pending the finalisation of their trial, 
unless it is absolutely necessary to do so to 
prevent an accused person from fleeing (subject 
to sufficient evidence).58 Instead, states should 
release accused persons on particular conditions 
and/or guarantees.59
The Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action 
on Accelerating Prisons and Penal Reforms in 
Africa60 seeks to further encourage alternative 
strategies to imprisonment.61 The Plan of Action 
sets out that remand detention should be a 
measure of last resort and should be for as short 
a period as possible. The plan mandates that 
police officers should have and exercise their 
wider bail powers, including the use of police 
bail (a process where a police officer can grant 
bail without a presiding officer), and that 
presiding officers should involve community 
members for bail hearings in order to gather more 
evidence about accused’s assets and/or their 
place of abode.62
The African Commission has stated that detention 
carried out by states based on discrimination 
amounts to the arbitrary deprivation of an 
accused’s right to liberty and, consequently, is 
a violation of article 6 of the African Charter.63 
This raises interesting questions in South Africa, 
where the majority of people living in poverty are 
black, and where adjudicating bail based on the 
absence of a fixed address and/or ownership of 
assets may be considered discriminatory.
Domestic law
The Constitution
Section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that 
everyone has the right to freedom and security 
of the person, which includes the right not to 
be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just 
cause.64 Section 12 guarantees both substantive 
and procedural protection of the right to freedom 
and security of the person. In S v Coetzee, 
Justice O’Regan described the two components 
of section 12 as follows: 
The first is concerned particularly with 
reasons for which the state may deprive 
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES & UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN24
someone of freedom; and the second 
is concerned with the manner whereby 
a person is deprived of freedom … our 
Constitution recognises that both aspects 
are important in a democracy: the state 
may not deprive its citizens of liberty for 
reasons that are not acceptable, nor 
when it deprives its citizens of freedom 
for acceptable reasons, may it do so in a 
manner that is procedurally unfair.65
Where presiding officers place too much 
weight on whether an accused person owns 
assets and/or has a verified address in 
determining whether to grant bail or not, they 
unfairly deprive the accused of his or her liberty, 
for the reasons set out above.66 Consequently, 
this practice is inconsistent with section 12(1) of 
the Constitution.
Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution provides 
that ‘everyone who is arrested for allegedly 
committing an offence has the right to be 
released from detention if the interests of justice 
permit, subject to reasonable conditions’.67 
Given prison conditions in South Africa, it 
should be in the interests of justice to release 
accused persons who have been denied bail 
merely because they do not own assets or 
have a fixed residential address. Failing to do so 
penalises their poverty (as Letaoana points out).
Section 1(c) of the Constitution provides ‘that 
the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democratic state founded on the value of 
supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of 
law’.68 The rule of law demands uniformity in the 
legal system. In Gcaba v Minister for Safety and 
Security,69 the Constitutional Court, in reference 
to the binding effect of judgments, held that 
‘precedents must be respected in order to 
ensure legal certainty and equality before the 
law’.70 It is not uniform for presiding officers to 
hear testimonies of family members to ascertain 
flight risk in some bail hearings, while insisting 
on a police officer’s affidavits in others. The 
manner in which flight risk is assessed should 
be flexible and yet uniform to ensure that it 
does not discriminate against certain groups of 
people. Discretion allowed to police and judicial 
officers should therefore be guided to ensure a 
level of fairness and consistency.71
Further, section 9(3) of the Constitution provides 
that ‘the state may not unfairly discriminate 
directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race … or social 
origin’.72 In President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Hugo, the court held the following 
regarding substantive equality: 
We need … to develop a concept of 
unfair discrimination which recognises 
that although a society which affords 
each human being equal treatment on 
the basis of equal worth and freedom is 
our goal, we cannot achieve that goal 
by insisting upon identical treatment 
in all circumstances before that goal 
is achieved. Each case, therefore, 
will require a careful and thorough 
understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular 
people concerned to determine whether 
its overall impact is one which furthers the 
constitutional goal of equality or not. A 
classification which is unfair in one 
context may not necessarily be unfair in a 
different context.
The Constitution therefore protects a number of 
rights of persons who have been arrested and 
detained: the right to freedom and security of 
the person (which includes the right not to be 
deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just 
cause), the right to be released from detention 
if the interests of justice permit, and the right 
to not be unfairly discriminated against directly 
or indirectly, based on one or more grounds, 
including race and social origin. In addition, the 
Constitution reminds us that one of the values 
our state is founded on is the rule of law. It is in 
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this constitutional framework that we need to 
protect and interpret the rights of persons who 
have been arrested and detained.
The Criminal Procedure Act
The Criminal Procedure Act73 (CPA) makes 
provision for criminal matters and their 
procedures.74 Chapter 9 of the CPA sets out 
provisions that relate to bail hearings.75
Section 60(1)(a) of the CPA, which emanates 
from section 35 of the Constitution, provides 
that ‘an accused who is in custody in respect 
of an offence shall, subject to the provisions of 
section 50(6), be entitled to be released on bail 
at any stage preceding his or her conviction in 
respect of such offence, if the court is satisfied 
that the interests of justice so permit’.76 Section 
60(4)(b) provides that ‘the interests of justice 
do not permit the release from detention of an 
accused where there is the likelihood that the 
accused, if he or she were released on bail, will 
attempt to evade his or her trial’.77
Section 60(6) further provides that
[i]n considering whether the ground in 
subsection (4)(b) has been established, 
the court may, where applicable, take into 
account the following factors, namely –
(a) the emotional, family, community or 
occupational ties of the accused to the 
place at which he or she is to be tried;
(b) the assets held by the accused and 
where such assets are situated;
(c) the means, and travel documents held 
by the accused, which may enable him 
or her to leave the country;
(d) the extent, if any, to which the accused 
can afford to forfeit the amount of bail 
which may be set;
(e) the question whether the extradition of 
the accused could readily be effected 
should he or she flee across the 
borders of the Republic in an attempt 
to evade his or her trial;
(f)  the nature and the gravity of the charge 
on which the accused is to be tried;
(g) the strength of the case against the 
accused and the incentive that he 
or she may in consequence have to 
attempt to evade his or her trial;
(h) the nature and gravity of the 
punishment which is likely to be 
imposed should the accused be 
convicted of the charges against him 
 or her;
(i)  the binding effect and enforceability 
of bail conditions which may be 
imposed and the ease with which such 
conditions could be breached; or
(j)  any other factor which in the 
 opinion of the court should be taken 
into account.78
None of the detailed set of factors set out 
in section 60(6) to guide a judicial officer 
when adjudicating bail specifically states that 
the accused must have a fixed address or 
ownership of assets. However, section 60(6)(a) 
and section 60(6)(b) may be interpreted to mean 
a fixed address and/or ownership of assets, 
although such an interpretation must still be in 
line with the constitutional rights (liberty, equality, 
the presumption of innocence etc.). Further, 
as provided for by the Constitution, such an 
assessment has to be uniform and predictable 
and done in a manner that does not violate 
international human rights law.
Other domestic instruments
The Protocol on the Procedure to be followed in 
applying Section 63A of the Criminal Procedure 
Act (the Bail Protocol) contains no information, 
process or procedure regarding the requirement 
of a fixed address and/or ownership of assets. It 
also does not set out the mechanisms through 
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which the addresses of accused persons in 
detention ought to be verified when the head of 
a correctional centre applies for bail on behalf of 
the accused.79
The National Instruction 3 of 2016: Bail and 
the Release of Persons (NI3)80 acknowledges 
that detention is a serious infringement of the 
detained person’s rights to liberty and freedom 
and security of the person. The instruction 
makes reference to police officers having to 
complete a SAPS 3M(k) form when verifying 
addresses of accused persons.81 The instruction 
requires the investigating officer to verify the 
correctness of the name, address and personal 
details of the accused by visiting the address that 
they have provided, contacting the accused’s 
family members or other contact persons they 
have nominated, and conducting enquiries on 
available state electronic systems (such as the 
fingerprint database or the traffic system, and by 
contacting the Department of Home Affairs).82
The instruction does not provide guidance on 
what to do if the accused person does not have 
a fixed address or an address that is formal and 
verifiable, and who does not have family, friends 
or neighbours who are able or willing to confirm 
any such address. In the absence of clarity on 
what to do in such cases, accused persons 
can remain in detention indefinitely, pending the 
finalisation of their trial. This is unconstitutional 
and a violation of international human rights law. 
Section 10 of NI3 explains that in terms of 
section 50(6)(d) of the CPA, the investigating 
officer may request the prosecutor to ask the 
court to postpone any bail proceedings or bail 
applications where the investigating officer has 
not managed to get the required information 
(for example, not having completed the SAPS 
3M(k) form). These cases may be postponed 
for seven days at a time. The instruction does 
not provide any insight into what constitutes 
legitimate reasons to justify why the investigating 
officer failed to procure the required information. 
It also does not set out what process should be 
followed to ensure protection of the accused’s 
constitutional and human rights in cases of 
repeated postponements or indefinite detention. 
The lacunas in the bail protocol and the National 
Instruction therefore have the effect of violating 
the equality of accused persons living in poverty.
Bail and the interests of justice
In S v Dlamini, the courts grappled with 
questions of the constitutional validity of the 
provisions relating to bail and the interests of 
justice.83 The decision in this case established 
that all bail laws must be measured against 
section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution, which 
provides for the release of arrestees where the 
interests of justice permit, subject to setting 
reasonable conditions that aim to facilitate 
the person’s arrest and not curtail it, where 
the interests of justice so require.84 The court 
clarified that this should apply to all instances 
where there is a deprivation of liberty, including 
postponements of bail proceedings.
The Dlamini case underlines three important 
principles. The first is that it accepts that people 
can be arrested even before it has been proven 
that they committed a crime and they are 
convicted. The second is that arrested persons 
have a right to be released on bail, subject to 
reasonable conditions, and third, that such 
release is assessed in terms of the interests 
of justice in each case.85 Bail is intended to 
maximise liberty through a weighing up of 
factors by the court.86 Arrests are meant to be a 
way to ensure that the accused attends trial,87 
and a court must decide whether continued 
detention is necessary to achieve that end.88
The interests of justice criterion found both 
in section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution and 
section 60 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
seeks to balance what is fair and just for the 
interested parties.89 Section 60(4) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act establishes a guideline for how 
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this ought to be determined and it is settled 
law that none of these factors should be given 
undue weight so as to deny bail even when it 
should be granted.90 There is also no reason 
to presuppose that an accused must be 
denied bail purely because there was a failure 
to verify his or her address, or because s/
he possesses very few assets (given that this 
fact alone does not make the accused a flight 
risk).91 Pre-trial detention can severely limit the 
rights of accused persons before their guilt has 
been determined. Adequately weighing and 
balancing the interest of justice is therefore 
critically important.
We are also particularly concerned about the 
use of section 50(d)(i) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act in order to postpone bail hearings. Although 
this section provides that a court can postpone 
a matter for up to seven days where there is 
insufficient information for considering bail (like 
failure to verify an address), the overburdened 
court rolls in the magistrates’ courts mean that 
remands are often longer than seven days in 
practice. Such delays are in violation of the 
accused’s right to a speedy decision.92
Section 50(d)(i) also introduces wide 
discretion and sees prosecutors’ requests for 
postponement accepted without further 
inquiry. In Majali v S,93 the state sought a 
postponement in terms of section 50(d)(i), as 
there were parts of the investigation into the 
accused’s past convictions that were 
incomplete for the purposes of bail. The court 
held that the prosecution ought to provide 
cogent reasons why they had not sought a 
postponement before the day of the bail 
hearing,94 and held that the court should 
balance the reasons put forward in support of 
the request for a postponement against 
considerations of the liberty of the accused.95 
In addition, where the prosecution has not 
shown good cause for postponement, the 
court must rely on the information provided by 
the applicant for bail, where this has not 
been disputed.96
We have seen from our own observations in 
practice that bail applications are either not 
heard or are postponed for verification when, 
on the basis of the information provided by 
the applicant, bail should in fact be granted. 
Where applicants have been denied bail 
because of the absence of a fixed address, the 
investigating officer has stated that the informal 
settlement was too convoluted to navigate, 
or that they were unable to find the house, 
or that no police cars were available. Often, 
as we have seen from our own observations, 
these reasons were not even interrogated 
by the magistrate. In our experience, the 
postponements in these cases are missed 
opportunities: the court would have sight of 
the applicant/accused’s evidence, and in the 
absence of good reasons for not having verified 
this information, or doubting its veracity, it 
should be considered by the court. Balancing 
the need to limit the deprivation of liberty of the 
accused against ensuring that s/he attends trial 
requires that the accused is released where 
the other factors under section 60(6) call for 
it. There are any number of interventions less 
extreme than imprisonment that can, and 
should, be considered.
Recommendations 
The South African state should consider rolling 
out an electronic monitoring system, a system 
that is used to track and record an accused 
person’s movements and location while s/he 
is out on bail.97 Although this kind of electronic 
system will require sufficient state resources 
to ensure that it is efficient and effective, its 
advantages may include increased public 
confidence in the criminal justice system, 
reduced harm associated with detention for 
arrestees, and a decrease in the numbers of 
remand detainees.98
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Judges, magistrates, attorneys, advocates and 
other officers of the court need further training 
or learning exchanges on the intersection of 
poverty, race and the criminal justice system. 
Increased emphasis should be placed on the 
use of the conditions under which an accused 
can be released (pending trial, instead of 
detention), and matters should be stood down 
rather than postponed while the investigating 
officer goes to look for the address, or gets 
assistance from the accused’s family. Further 
research ought to be done on the prevalence 
of the practice of placing more weight on 
certain bail factors than others. Such research 
should be done in collaboration with legal aid 
attorneys, who are already in courts across the 
country on a daily basis.
It is important that we explore less extreme 
measures than remand, where appropriate. 
Cases where the only reason for postponing 
or denying bail is that the address verification 
is missing should ordinarily use less restrictive 
means. Finally, there should also be widespread 
education campaigns for the general public on 
the importance of the concept of innocence 
until proven guilty, and the protections in law 
around bail. 
Conclusion
Our limited research in South African 
magistrates’ courts suggests that presiding 
officers place too much weight on whether 
an accused owns assets and/or has a fixed 
address when determining flight risk during bail 
hearings. This practice exacerbates conditions 
in South African prisons, where the remand 
detainee population is still unacceptably high. 
This article has considered this practice in light 
of international and domestic human rights 
law instruments: the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Constitution, 
the Correctional Services Act and the Criminal 
Procedure Act. These instruments all protect the 
rights of detainees, including the right to liberty, 
the right to be presumed innocent, the right to 
equality and the right to be detained only as a 
measure of last resort. We argue that relying too 
heavily on asset ownership and fixed address 
to determine an accused’s flight risk during bail 
hearings is a violation of all the rights discussed 
above, and is not in line with international 
human rights law.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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